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BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
347 U.S. 483
BROWN ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF KANSAS. * No. 1.
Argued December 9, 1952. Reargued December 8, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local
conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together
in this consolidated opinion. [1] [347
U.S. 483, 487]
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal
representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public
schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [347
U.S. 483, 488] they
had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws
requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was
alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a
three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the
so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though
these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted
to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not
"equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance
of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. [2] Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on
certain questions propounded by the Court. [3] [347 U.S. 483, 489]
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of
the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices
in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the
Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although
these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with
which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of
the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the
letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited
effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history,
with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that
time. [4] In the South,
the movement toward free common schools, supported [347
U.S. 483, 490] by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children
was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost
nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any
education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast,
many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well
as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school
education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but
the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the
congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did
not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary;
ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three
months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually
unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little
in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on
public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided
shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all
state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. [5] The doctrine of [347 U.S. 483, 491] "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court
until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. [6] American
courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this
Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal"
doctrine in the field of public education. [7] In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 , and Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78 , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. [8] In more recent cases, all on the graduate school [347
U.S. 483, 492] level, inequality was found in that
specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the
same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 ; McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 . In none of these cases was it
necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And
in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the
question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public
education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike
Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools
involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings,
curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other
"tangible" factors. [9] Our
decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must
look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout [347
U.S. 483, 493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for
Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court
relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to
a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to
intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn
his profession." [347 U.S. 483, 494] Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was
well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt
compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." [10]
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. [11] Any language [347 U.S. 483, 495] in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. [12]
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation
of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On
reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated
to the primary question - the constitutionality of segregation in public
education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the
parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and
the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5
previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. [13] The Attorney General [347 U.S. 483,
496] of the United
States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states
requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted
to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and
submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. [14]
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] In the
Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of
elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a
Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000
population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students.
Kan. Gen. Stat. 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of
Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public
schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, found that
segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children,
but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were
substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and
educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp. 797. The case is here on
direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the South Carolina case, Briggs v.
Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school
age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement
of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the
segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, 7;
S. C. Code 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C.
2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro
schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin
immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of
the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission [347
U.S. 483, 487] to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529.
This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the
purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants
concerning the progress made in the equalization program. 342 U.S. 350 . On
remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved
except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this
inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal
under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward
county. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and
whites in public schools. Va. Const., 140; Va. Code 22-221 (1950). The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, denied the
requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant,
curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide
substantially equal curricula and transportation and to "proceed with all
reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical
plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of
the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white
schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on
direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in
New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to
enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code
which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del.
Const., Art. X, 2; Del. Rev. Code 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for
the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously
attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were
inferior with respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular
activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved [347
U.S. 483, 488] in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation
itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra),
but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's
decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however,
that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after
equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137,
152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in
ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools,
applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891 . The
plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.
[ Footnote 2 ] 344 U.S. 1, 141 , 891.
[ Footnote 3 ] 345 U.S. 972 . The Attorney
General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.
[ Footnote 4 ] For a general study of the
development of public education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A
History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public
Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts
and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight,
Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No.
315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools
followed substantially the same pattern in both the North and the South, the
development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some
twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower
development in the South (e. g., the rural character of the South and the
different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in
Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the
South, the War [347 U.S. 483, 490] virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The
low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and
immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of
Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school
attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in
all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.
[ Footnote 5 ] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall.
36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 -308 (1880):
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but [347
U.S. 483, 491] declaring
that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white;
that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of
the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against
them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a
subject race." See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 -345 (1880).
[ Footnote 6 ] The doctrine apparently
originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding
school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional
guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in
1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public
education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent
that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of
sectional concern.
[ Footnote 7 ] See also Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
[ Footnote 8 ] In the Cumming case, Negro
taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to
discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the board
resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong
Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state
authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children
and requiring him to attend a Negro school.
[ Footnote 9 ] In the Kansas case, the court
below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798.
In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were
proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's
decree." 103 F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted
that the equalization program was already "afoot and progressing" (103
F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney
General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the
Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization
program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.
[ Footnote 10 ] A similar finding was made in
the Delaware case: "I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware
society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro
children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are
substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly
situated." 87 A. 2d 862, 865.
[ Footnote 11 ] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice
and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House Conference
on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making
(1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced
Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948);
Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of [347
U.S. 483, 495] Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and
Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and
National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United
States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
[ Footnote 12 ] See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p.
497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
[ Footnote 13 ] "4. Assuming it is decided
that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment "(a)
would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the [347
U.S. 483, 496] limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or "(b) may this Court,
in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to
be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color
distinctions? "5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are
based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to
the end described in question 4 (b), "(a) should this Court formulate
detailed decrees in these cases; "(b) if so, what specific issues should
the decrees reach; "(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear
evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees; "(d)
should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to
frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the
decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed
decrees?"
[ Footnote 14 ] See Rule 42, Revised Rules of
this Court (effective July 1, 1954). [347
U.S. 483, 497]
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